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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Amanda Mae J enquine appeals from her conviction for possession of methamphetamine

arguing that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress.

Statement

At

Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
around 12:30 a.m., Ofﬁcer Eric Bailey observed a vehicle parked facing the wrong

direction in the drive-through lane of a closed fast-food restaurant. (R., pp. 166-67.1)

He

J

approached the vehicle and saw enquine asleep in the driver’s seat, with a half empty bottle of
hard alcohol on the passenger seat and an empty bottle on the ﬂoor. (R., p. 167.) He knocked on
the window and spoke with

Jenquine,

immediately noticing the smell of alcohol and that her

speech was slurred. (R., p. 167; Tr., p. 18,

L. 22 — p.

19,

L. 3; Vid.

stated that she was taking a nap and, when asked how much

1,

00:00 — 00:20.2) Jenquine

of the bottle of alcohol

consumed, she responded, “not much.” (R., p. 167; Vid. 1, 00:20

—

she had

00:30.) Ofﬁcer Bailey asked

where she had been drinking and she responded, “Yeah, I was drinking before I even got here.”

(R., pp. 167-68; Vid. l, 01:30

—

01:42.) Asked how long she had been sleeping there, she

responded since four or ﬁve in the afternoon. (R., p. 168; Vid. 1, 01:42

her information, Ofﬁcer Bailey asked

if

—

02:00.) After checking

she had driven there, she responded that she had and

The district court made extensive factual ﬁndings in association with the motion to suppress at
issue on appeal. (R., pp. 166-71.) None of those factual ﬁndings are contested by Jenquine.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 1, 12.)
2
References to “Tr.” are to the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress, held 9/10/19.
At that hearing, three clips from body-cam videos were introduced on one disk as Exhibit A.
(Tr., p. l3, L. 15 — p. l4, L. 6.) Those clips are in the record in AVI ﬁles titled “2019-04-21_0029-08,” “2019-04-21_00-37-58,” and “2019-04-20_00-46-08,” and will be referred to herein as
“Vid. 1,” “Vid. 2,” and Vid. 3,” respectively.
1

conﬁrmed again that she had been drinking that night, and he asked her to step out of the vehicle

for ﬁeld sobriety tests (FSTs).

(R., pp. 168-69; Vid.

1,

04:00

—

04:30.) After she protested that

she was not driving then, Ofﬁcer Bailey pointed out that she had driven to get to the fast-food

restaurant and she responded, “Yeah, but I drank before I even got here.”
1,

04:30

—

04:40.) As she continued to protest, she asked

if she

Bailey stated that she was being detained in a DUI investigation.

(R., pp. 168-69; Vid.

was under arrest and Ofﬁcer

(R., p. 169; Vid.

1,

04:40

—

Jenquine then changed her story and claimed that she drove to the location before she

05:18.)

had anything to drink. (R., pp. 169-70; Vid. 1, 05:18

—

05:53.) She asked

if she

could call a

lawyer before any FSTs and Ofﬁcer Bailey responded that she could not because they were only
in the “investigation stage,” after which Jenquine agreed to the FSTs and stepped out of her

vehicle. (R., p. 170; Vid. 1, 05:54 — 06:50.)

While Ofﬁcer Bailey administered the FSTs, two other ofﬁcers arrived on scene. (R., p.
170.)

Ofﬁcer Bailey conducted one of the FSTs, the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, twice

J

because he believed enquine’s long eyelashes prevented accurate results the ﬁrst time. (R., p.
170;

Vid.

test, one

1,

07:40

—

09:30, 14:00

—

15:02.) While Ofﬁcer Bailey was performing that second

of the other ofﬁcers observed in plain View a small bag of white powder that he believed

to be narcotics sitting on the driver’s seat

06:20; 07:45

—

of Jenquine’s vehicle. (R.,

p. 170;

Vid. 2, 05:55

—

08:00.) Ofﬁcers recovered that bag, the contents of which tested positive for

methamphetamine. (R., p. 170.) They also recovered additional contraband wrapped in a ﬁfty-

dollar bill located in J enquine’s purse. (R., p. 170.)

Jenquine was charged by complaint with possession of methamphetamine

(R., pp. 11-12)

and, in a separate matter that was consolidated with this one, with possessing and/or drinking

from an open container of alcohol in a vehicle (R., pp. 25), and was bound over following a

She ﬁled a motion to suppress the evidence found in her

preliminary hearing (R., p. 43).3

vehicle, arguing that she was unlawfully seized for a DUI investigation because Ofﬁcer Bailey
did not see her driving (R., pp. 75-76); that she was unlawfully denied a right to counsel prior to

any FSTs (R., pp. 76-77); and, even

if she was initially detained,

the detention was unlawfully

extended, particularly when Ofﬁcer Bailey conducted a second horizontal gaze nystagmus test

(R., pp. 77-78).
Following a hearing at which Ofﬁcer Bailey testiﬁed, the district court denied the motion.
The court held that, notwithstanding the fact that Ofﬁcer Bailey did not see J enquine drive, he
had reasonable suspicion sufﬁcient to justify a

DUI investigation and the associated detention of

Jenquine, including for FSTs (R., pp. 173-77); that the detention was not unlawﬁllly extended

(R., pp. 178-79); and that no right to counsel was violated because Jenquine was not subject to a
custodial interrogation and had not been charged with any crime when she requested to speak

with an attorney (R., pp. 180-81).
In association with a plea agreement,

Jenquine pled guilty to possession of

methamphetamine and, in a separate but consolidated case, to inattentive driving, while the open

container charge was dismissed and she preserved the right to appeal the denial of her motion to
suppress.

(R., pp. 187, 191-92, 213, 215.) With respect to the possession of methamphetamine

J

charge, the district court sentenced enquine to four years with one year ﬁxed, and suspended that
sentence in favor
appealed.

3

of two and a half years of probation. (R., pp. 217-20.) Jenquine timely

(R., pp. 225-28.)

Though a felony information was subsequently ﬁled (R., p. 4), it is apparently not in the record.

ISSUE

Jenquine states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. J enquine’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)
The state rephrases the issue as:

J

Has enquine failed to show that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err BV Denving J enquine’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction

“Mindful that the district court’s factual ﬁndings were supported by substantial evidence,

J

and the court’s legal conclusion are consistent with applicable precedent,” enquine challenges

only the district court’s conclusion that Ofﬁcer Bailey had reasonable suspicion sufﬁcient to
detain Jenquine in a DUI investigation. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-124)

As

she did below, she

argues that he did not because she was parked when he arrived and—at one point, at least—she

denied drinking prior to driving to arriving. (Id.) She is incorrect.

As

the district court correctly

recognized, Ofﬁcer Bailey had reasonable suspicion in the totality of the circumstances justifying
a detention to investigate driving under the inﬂuence.

B.

Standard

Of Review

In reviewing a district court’s order granting a motion to suppress the appellate court

“will accept

the trial court’s ﬁndings

of fact unless they are clearly erroneous” but will “freely

review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.”
V. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 671, 450 P.3d 315, 319 (2019) (quotation marks omitted).

4

Jenquine claims that the issue raised below regarding the Violation of some right to counsel
rises and falls with the question whether the detention was lawful, and so does not address it on
appeal. (Appellant’s brief, p. ll n.. 2.) Neither does she address the argument below that the
detention was unlawfully extended.
generally Appellant’s brief.) Those arguments are
therefore abandoned on appeal. Bach V. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152
(2010) (“We will not consider an issue not supported by argument and authority in the opening
brief.” (quotation marks omitted)).

C.

Ofﬁcer Bailey Had Reasonable Suspicion Sufﬁcient For An Investigatorv Detention

“[L]imited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible
when justiﬁed by an ofﬁcer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime.” State V. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009)

(citing Florida V. Roger, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)). Evidence sufﬁcient to establish reasonable
suspicion is “less than that necessary to establish probable cause” but requires “more than a mere

hunch.” Li. “[T]he likelihood of criminal activity [required for reasonable suspicion] need not
rise to the level required for probable cause and it falls considerably short of satisfying a
preponderance

of the evidence standard.” State v. Bonner,

458-59 (2020).

167 Idaho 88,

_,

467 P.3d 452,

“[C]ourts must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see

whether the detaining ofﬁcer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal

wrongdoing.” Id. at ___,

467 P.3d at 459 (quotation marks omitted).

The district court correctly determined that Ofﬁcer Bailey had reasonable articulable
suspicion of driving under the inﬂuence sufﬁcient to justify an investigative detention, including

F STs. (R.,

pp. 173-77.) He found a vehicle parked in the middle

of the night facing the wrong

direction in the drive-through lane of a closed fast-food restaurant. (R., pp. 166-67.) He then
found Jenquine asleep behind the wheel of that vehicle and, when he woke her, he smelled

alcohol, noticed her speech was slurred, and observed an open, half-empty bottle of hard alcohol

sitting next to her. (R., pp. 166-67.) She then told him multiple times that she had been drinking
that evening and that she drank before she drove to the location in which he found her.

167-69.)

All of

(R., pp.

that was more than sufﬁcient for Ofﬁcer Bailey to reasonably suspect that

Jenquine had driven under the inﬂuence of alcohol. In fact, in State V. Rocha, 157 Idaho 246,

249-50, 335 P.3d 586, 5 89-90 (Ct. App. 2014), the Court of Appeals afﬁrmed a guilty verdict on

a charge

of driving under the inﬂuence Where the evidence was virtually identical to the facts

with which Ofﬁcer Bailey was confronted.

ali State V. Webb,

118 Idaho 99, 102, 794 P.2d

1155, 1158 (Ct. App. 1990) (ﬁnding probable cause for arrest under relevantly similar facts).

Because Ofﬁcer Bailey reasonably suspected Jenquine of driving under the inﬂuence, he could
detain her and request that she perform FSTs. State V. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d

700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999) (“[F]ield sobriety tests are the least intrusive means reasonably

available to verify or dispel the ofﬁcer’s suspicion in a short period of time that a driver is in
Violation of I.C. § 18-8004.”).

The fact that she later also stated that she started drinking only after she drove to the
location in which he found her does not change that fact in the least. In the ﬁrst place, reasonable
articulable suspicion is a standard falling short of probable cause, “considerably short” of
“preponderance of the evidence,” and certainly does not require completely univocal evidence.
167 Idaho at

to be skeptical

_,

467 P.3d at 458-59. But, second, Ofﬁcer Bailey had very good reason

of Jenquine’s claim that she only started drinking when

she arrived where he

found her. Her new, self-serving claim contradicted what she had already repeatedly said. It was
also highly implausible. She claimed she had been where he found her since four or ﬁve in the
afternoon, and Ofﬁcer Bailey recognized that she could not have been there that long because the
restaurant surely would have called police if, while open, she had been parked the wrong

direction in their drive-through lane. (Vid.

l, 09:30 — 09:50.)

Further, Ofﬁcer Bailey had driven

by the restaurant several times since he started his shift at eight p.m. and had not seen Jenquine
parked there until the last time he drove by, around 12:30 a.m. (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 3-16.) He testiﬁed
that, had she been parked there when he drove by previously, he would have noticed. (Tr., p. 27,

Ls. 3-6.) Finally, Jenquine stated that the half-empty bottle of hard alcohol was “new” that

evening, making it clear that she had been drinking for some time.

Wid.

2, 04:38

—

05:05; Tr., p.

J

31, Ls. 1-12.) Based on all of that, Ofﬁcer Bailey was perfectly reasonable in doubting enquine

when she stated that she had not had anything to drink before parking where he found her. (Tr.,
p. 28, Ls. 1-16; p. 34,

As

L.

19 —p. 35,

L. 22.)

the district court correctly found, Ofﬁcer

J

that enquine had driven under the inﬂuence

Bailey had reasonable articulable suspicion

of alcohol. Her detention, including for FSTs, was

J

therefore lawful and enquine has not shown that the district court erred by denying her motion to
suppress.

CONCLUSION
The state respectﬁllly requests this Court to afﬁrm J enquine’s judgment of conviction.

DATED this 20th day of January, 2021.
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